Cross Jurisdictional Tolling of the Statute of Limitations In Antitrust Claims: Plaintiffs Lose Their Day in Federal Court by Koltse, John J.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 5 
5-1-2006 
Cross Jurisdictional Tolling of the Statute of Limitations In 
Antitrust Claims: Plaintiffs Lose Their Day in Federal Court 
John J. Koltse 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John J. Koltse, Cross Jurisdictional Tolling of the Statute of Limitations In Antitrust Claims: Plaintiffs 
Lose Their Day in Federal Court, 1 Seventh Circuit Rev. 20 (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/5 
This Civil Procedure is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons 
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
20 
CROSS JURISDICTIONAL TOLLING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN ANTITRUST 




     JOHN J. KOLTSE∗ 
 
Cite as: John J. Koltse, Cross Jurisdictional Tolling of the Statute of Limitations in 
Antitrust Claims: Plaintiffs Lose Their Day in Federal Court, 1 SEVENTH CIRCUIT 





 Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the 
issue of whether the filing of a state antitrust class action tolls the 
statute of limitations for individual members of that class, who after 
dismissal of their state class action, attempt to file individual federal 
antitrust claims.1  State supreme courts have wrestled with the related 
question of whether the filing of a federal class action tolls the statute 
of limitations for class members who seek to file subsequent state law 
claims after their federal class action is dismissed, reaching opposing 
outcomes.2   However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Copper 
                                                 
 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; University of Illinois B.A. December 2002. 
1See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2006).  
2See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 335 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (finding 
that Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee would all accept 
cross jurisdictional tolling); Vaccareillo v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio 
St. 3d 380 (Ohio 2001) (Ohio Supreme Court adopted cross jurisdictional tolling in 
an antitrust case); Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807 
(Tenn. 2000) (stating Tennessee has adopted cross jurisdictional tolling through its 
1
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Antitrust Litigation3 marked the first time a federal Court of Appeals 
addressed whether members of a state class action whose case had 
been dismissed could benefit from the cross jurisdictional tolling of 
the statute of limitations for their subsequent federal claims.   
The factual underpinnings of In re Copper Antitrust Litigation,4 
where the very same antitrust claims that were dismissed in the state 
class action were subsequently filed individually by class members in 
the federal action,5 forced the Seventh Circuit to address the issue of 
cross jurisdictional tolling head on.  In a 2-1 decision, the court held 
that the filing of a state class action has no tolling effect on the statute 
of limitations for subsequently filed federal claims, thereby refusing to 
adopt the theory of cross jurisdictional tolling.6  
Initially, this Article discusses the conflicts in class action 
procedure between the statute of limitations and class certification that 
necessitated a tolling rule for class members so that their interests 
could truly be protected in the class action procedure, and then 
examines the subsequent expansion of the tolling doctrine.  Next, this 
Article recounts the procedural history of the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in In re Copper Antitrust Litigation,7 where the Plaintiff’s 
asserted state class action antitrust claims and then later filed 
individual federal antitrust claims presented the possibility that the 
tolling doctrine could be extended to apply across jurisdictions.  The 
final section of this Article analyzes the rationales asserted by the 
majority In re Copper Antitrust Litigation8 which refused to extend the 
tolling doctrine to the cross jurisdictional context and Judge Wood’s 
                                                                                                                   
 
savings statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-115 (2000)); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 
183 Ill.2d 459 (Ill. 1998) (Illinois Supreme Court declined to adopt cross 
jurisdictional tolling). 
3In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 784-85. 
4Id. 
 
 5Id. at 788.  
 6Id. at 796. 
7436 F.3d 782. 
8Id. 
2
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dissent which contended that the parallel state and federal antitrust 
statutory schemes provided the proper context to apply the tolling 
doctrine in the cross jurisdictional context.            
In order to fully understand the rationale behind the court’s 
decision, the relationship between state and federal antitrust law, as 
well as the procedural workings of class actions, must be examined.   
 
I. HISTORY OF CLASS ACTION TOLLING 
     
Antitrust laws have provided fertile ground for the maintenance of 
class action suits.9  Specifically, two criteria of the Clayton Act,10 the 
federal statutory scheme regulating anticompetitive business practices, 
enable antitrust claims to grow into complex class action lawsuits: (1) 
a broad standing requirement,11 and (2) a grant of diversity jurisdiction 
irrespective of the amount in controversy.12  These two characteristics 
of the Clayton Act13 create a large pool of prospective plaintiffs with 
many small claims against a single defendant.14  Similarly, the purpose 
of the Sherman Act,15 which protects against limitations on the free 
flow of interstate commerce, has been interpreted broadly to allow 
                                                 
 
9See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class 
Actions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 414 (1997) (“[T]he roots of antitrust class action 
practice can be traced to the very beginning of the antitrust laws.”). 
1015 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).   
11Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (“[Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act] does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to 
competitors, or to sellers. . . . The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, 
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they 
may be perpetrated.”). 
12See HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 
18:1 (4th ed. 2002) (“Congress has given private citizens rights of action for 
injunctive relief and damages for antitrust violations without regard to the amount in 
controversy.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (2002); 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (2002)). 
1315 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006). 
14See Newberg, supra note 10, at § 18:1.  
1515 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).   
3
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private individuals to pursue diverse antitrust claims.16   However, 
instead of requiring these prospective plaintiffs to file suits 
individually, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 allows a single 
plaintiff to represent all individuals who suffered an antitrust injury 
through a class action in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions within 
federal court.17  
While a class action may improve efficiency by combining 
numerous claims into one action, it also presents procedural 
complications for individual class members, such as with the statute of 
limitations.18  Initially, after the passage of Rule 23, federal courts 
dealt with a statute of limitations problem that arose out of the timing 
of class certification decisions.19  
Until a class of plaintiffs is certified, the proposed members of the 
class are typically unaware of the pending suit because they have not 
yet received notice of the suit.20  Because class certification decisions 
are often in-depth and lengthy proceedings, the statute of limitations 
applicable to the prospective plaintiffs’ claims often expire before the 
court decides whether to certify the class.21  Therefore, if the court did 
                                                 
 
16Paramount Pictures Inc. v. United Motion Picture Theater Owners, Inc., 93 
F.2d 714, 719 (3d Cir. 1937) (“Congress intended by the anti-trust acts to prevent all 
combinations and conspiracies, whether composed of employees, employers, 
producers, users, or consumers, from unreasonably restraining the free flow of 
interstate commerce”).  
17See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974) (purpose of 
Rule 23 is to prevent a multiplicity of actions).   
18See RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE, 460 (4th ed. 2004) (class 
actions create timing problems with the statute of limitations). 
19Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 550 (considering whether statute of 
limitations for putative class members should be tolled while the court decides class 
certification); See also Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968); Philadelphia 
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (ED Pa. 1968). 
20See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (no class action 
may be “dismissed or compromised without [court] approval,” preceded by notice to 
class members) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(e)).   
21 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 551 (recognizing that putative class 
members may not assert claims before the statute of limitations because they are 
4
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not toll the statute of limitations for prospective class members, either 
unaware of their claims or waiting for their claims to be resolved in 
the commenced class action, foreclosed class members from taking 
any individual action in the suit.22  This “black-hole” created by the 
intersection of the timing of a class certification decision and the 
expiration of the statue of limitations creates problems when the court 
ultimately refuse sto certify a class.23    
If the class was eventually certified, prospective class members 
escaped this black-hole because Rule 23 provides that their claims are 
asserted on their behalf by the class representative, and thus there was 
no need for prospective class members to take individual action in the 
suit.24  However, if the court ultimately refuses to certify the class, 
without the benefit of tolling , prospective class members needed to 
take individual action if they sought to intervene in the suit.25  
                                                                                                                   
 
unaware that the suit existed or anticipated that their interests would be protected if 
they knew of the commencement of the suit); see also Escott v. Barchris 
Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring) 
(interplay between statute of limitations and class certification presents a “trap” for 
putative class members that are unaware of the pending suit until after the statute of 
limitations has expired and then later seek to protect their interests). 
22Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 551. 
23Id. at 551-52 (although the Court's rationale supports tolling only for claims 
of putative class members who actually rely on the pendency of a class action, the 
tolling doctrine adopted by the court also applies to claims of class members who do 
not rely on, or who were unaware of, a pending class action). 
 24At least with regard to preserving their claims. Id. at 550 ( “filing of a timely 
class action complaint commences the action for all members of the class as 
subsequently determined”).    
25The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for two types of intervention. 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2) grants an intervention as of right: “(1) when a statute of 
the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” Fed R. Civ. Proc. 
24(b)(2) allows for permissive intervention: “(1) when a statute of the United States 
confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense 
and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.”  
5
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The Supreme Court in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,26 
addressed this problem involving the relationship between the statute 
of limitations and class certification by establishing a class action 
tolling rule, whereby the statute of limitations for intervenors is tolled 
until the court makes a class certification decision.27  By tolling the 
statute of limitations during the class certification process prospective 
class members no longer lose their right to individual action in the suit 
before they were even aware of the suit,28 thereby removing the black-
hole from the Rule 23 landscape.   
In American Pipe,29 the State of Utah filed a class action in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah eleven days before 
the four year statute of limitations ran under the Sherman Act.30  After 
seven months, the district court dismissed Utah’s petition for class 
certification, which sought to represent public agencies in Utah and 
surrounding states that used concrete and steel.31  Eight days after the 
district court dismissed the class action, more than sixty towns, 
municipalities and water districts in the State of Utah, each of whom 
had been members of the dismissed class, filed a motion to intervene 
in the suit.32  The district court denied the motions to intervene, 
concluding that the intervenors had no interest in the suit because the 
statute of limitations, which applied to their Sherman Act33 claims, had 
expired.34  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district courts 
decision, denying the motions to intervene and concluding that the 
intervenors claims had not expired under the statute of limitations 
because they were effectively filed when the State of Utah originally 
filed a class action on behalf of them as members of a class.35  
                                                 
 
26Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 538.    
 27Id. at 559.  
28Id. at 551. 
29Id. 
 30Id. at 541. 
31 Id. at 542.  
32Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538 at 543-544. 
3315 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 34Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538 at 544. 
 35Id.    
6
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision,36 but 
did not limit its decision to the precise time when prospective class 
members’ claims were filed.  Instead, the Supreme Court extended the 
logic of the Ninth Circuit, noting: 
 
[P]otential class members retain the option to participate in or 
withdraw from the class action only until a point in the 
litigation “as soon as practical after the commencement” of the 
action when the suit is allowed to continue as a class action 
and they are sent notice of their inclusion within the confines 
of the class.”37   
 
 Defining class certification as the point in which class members 
must decide whether to opt out of a class action, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the notion that taking individual action in the suit after the 
statutory limitations has run amounts to a “separate cause of action.”38 
The Supreme Court concluded that in light of the amendments to Rule 
23, “a federal class action is no longer an invitation to joinder but a 
truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, 
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.”39  The Supreme 
Court went on to reason that if it only allowed potential class members 
to participate in a class action if they filed motions to intervene before 
the statute of limitations had run, the efficiency principles behind Rule 
23, which was designed to allow one plaintiff to file a claim on behalf 
of numerous similarly situated plaintiffs to avoid repetitious filings, 
                                                 
 
 36Id. at 559.  
37Id. at 549 (citing subdivision (c)(1) of Rule 23, which provides “As soon as 
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court 
shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this 
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision 
on the merits.”).   
 38Id. at 550. (specifically overruling the decision in Athas v. Day, 161 F.Supp. 
916 (Colo. 1958) (holding that claims filed by class members after the expiration of 
the statute of limitations constituted a “separate cause of action.”)). 
39Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 550.   
7
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would be defeated.40  Therefore, to best protect the efficiencies of Rule 
23, the Supreme Court adopted a tolling rule which dictates that the 
commencement of a class action suit suspends the applicable statute of 
limitations for all proposed members of the class,41 including absent 
class members.42  By adopting a class action tolling rule, the Supreme 
Court gave considerable power to absent class members to extend the 
time period in which to file claims.43  
The tolling doctrine established in American Pipe44 plays an 
important role in assuring that members of a class can actually 
participate in the class action litigation, especially when they believe 
the class representative has not adequately represented their interests.45  
However, the tolling doctrine grew to encompass a far greater power 
for class members, the ability to have the statute of limitations tolled 
for any subsequent individual claims when a class action status is not 
granted.46  After appellate courts began to limit the American Pipe 
tolling doctrine strictly to putative class members who filed motions to 
                                                 
 
 40Id. at 553-554. 
 41Id. at 554.  
42Id. at 551-52 (“We think no different standard should apply to those members 
of the class who did not rely upon the commencement of the class action (or who 
were even unaware that such a suit existed) and thus cannot claim that they are 
refrained from bringing timely motions for individual intervention or joinder because 
of a belief that their interests would be represented in the class suit”).   
43See e.g., Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The 
Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 532, 540 (1996) (“American Pipe thus invested civil litigants with 
unusual power.  Merely by filing a pleading labeled a ‘class action,’ the Court 
enabled individual litigants to alter the otherwise applicable limitations period 
affecting asserted claims.”). 
44Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538. 
45Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 544, n.8 (providing the requirements for 
intervention as of right which allows for intervention when the class member’s 
interests are not adequately represented). 
46See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354-55 (1983) 
(“Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of 
the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may 
choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.”). 
8
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intervene after class action status was denied,47 the Supreme Court 
expanded the scope of the tolling doctrine.   
In order to justify expanding the tolling doctrine to subsequent 
individual claims asserted by class action members, the Supreme 
Court in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker,48 reiterated its 
previous holding in American Pipe49 that a tolling rule for class 
actions is not inconsistent with the purposes served by statutes of 
limitations.50  Noting that the primary purposes of limitations periods 
were met when a class action is commenced,51 the Court determined 
that class members that do not file independent suits while the class 
action is still proceeding are not “sleeping on their rights,” specifically 
because Rule 23 encourages class members to allow the named 
plaintiffs to pursue their claims.52  Combined with the view that class 
complaints adequately put defendants on notice of the claims sought 
against them and that they should preserve appropriate evidence, the 
Court stated that tolling the statute of limitations presents no element 
of unfair surprise to defendants who are later faced with either a 
motion to intervene or a latter individual suit by an absent class 
member.53  The Supreme Court concluded that if the tolling rule did 
not also apply to individuals filing an individual suit, such an 
application would prejudice class members who do not wish to 
intervene, but rather opt out of the class action all together.54 
                                                 
 
 47Id. at 348-49 (citing Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1982); Stull v. 
Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 783 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
48Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345. 
49Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538. 
50See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. at 352 (“Limitations periods are 
intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from 
sleeping on their rights, but these ends are met when a class action is 
commenced.”)(citations omitted).   
51Id.   
 52Id.   
 53Id.  
 54Id. at 350-51.  Class members may prefer to opt out of the class action 
entirely and file an individual suit as opposed to intervening based on the 
9
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While the majority in Crown55 readily extended the tolling 
doctrine to class members subsequent individual claims, the 
concurrence offered by Justice Powell cautioned that the “tolling rule 
of American Pipe is a generous one, inviting abuse.”56  In light of the 
new expansive tolling rule Justice Powell warned district courts that 
they should only apply the tolling doctrine to a class members 
individual lawsuit if that “suit raises claims that concern the same 
evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original 
class suit so that the defendant will not be prejudiced.”57  
Although the tolling doctrine is established law within the federal 
courts, there remains a parallel question of whether the Supreme 
Court’s rational in American Pipe58 and Crown59 can be applied to toll 
the statute of limitations in a completely different jurisdiction.  Much 
litigation and scholarship has addressed whether the filing of a federal 
class action tolls the statute of limitations for individual class members 
in state court claims.60  The intricacies and individual preferences of 
state courts have created a split in state courts over whether they will 
accommodate cross jurisdictional tolling.61  Despite the relative 
frequency with which state courts have addressed cross jurisdictional 
tolling, the Seventh Circuit recently became the first federal Appellate 
                                                                                                                   
 
inconvenience of the forum the class action is situated in, a desire to maintain 
complete control over the litigation, or as a result of the court’s refusal to grant 
intervention. Id. at 351-352. 
55Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345. 
56Id.at 354.  
57Id. at 355 (internal quotations omitted).   
58Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
59Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.  
60See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 335 (finding that Colorado, 
Indiana, Kansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee would all accept cross jurisdictional 
tolling); Vaccareillo v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 94 Ohio St. 3d 380 (Ohio 
2001) (Ohio Supreme Court adopted cross jurisdictional tolling in an antitrust case); 
Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tenn. 2000) (stating 
Tennessee has adopted cross jurisdictional tolling through its savings statute, TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 28-1-115 (2000)); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 183 Ill.2d 459 (Ill. 
1998) (Illinois Supreme Court declined to adopt cross jurisdictional tolling). 
61See supra note 58. 
10
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Court to decide whether the principals of American Pipe62 and 
Crown63 allow a member of a state class action to receive the benefit 
of tolling for their subsequently filed individual federal claims.64   
The warnings of Justice Powell’s concurrence in Crown65 
seemingly predicted the debate over whether cross jurisdictional 
tolling should extend to federal courts.66  The majority’s opinion in In 
re Copper Antitrust Litigation67 relied on Justice Powell’s trepidation 
that the court’s precedent of extending tolling from intervenors to class 
members who assert subsequent independent claims was inviting 
abuse of Supreme Court precedent, and denied cross jurisdictional 
tolling as an abuse of the American Pipe68 tolling doctrine that over 
extends its logic.69  The dissent, however, asserted Justice Powell’s 
“same evidence, memories, and witnesses” test70 as a rationale to 
allow cross jurisdictional tolling, contending that the state class action 
anti-trust claims alleged by the plaintiffs were exactly the same as the 
claims subsequently they later alleged individually in federal court.71        
The interplay between state and federal antitrust laws provided a 
particularly good landscape for the Seventh Circuit to address cross 
jurisdictional tolling.  Many state courts have adopted the federal 
antitrust scheme in their state antitrust laws, thereby creating nearly 
identical state and federal remedies for antitrust claims.72  Because the 
                                                 
 
62Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538. 
63Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345. 
64In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.    
65Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.  
66Id. at 354-55 (“the tolling rule of American Pipe is a generous one, inviting 
abuse [and should be limited to situations involving] the same evidence, memories, 
and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit so that the defendant 
will not be prejudiced.”). 
67In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.     
68Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. 538. 
69In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 796 (citing Judge Meskill’s dissent 
in Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d. Cir. 1987)).   
70Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. at 355.   
 71In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 799.     
72See, e.g,. Odom v. Lee, 999 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 2000); (Claims brought 
under Alaska Stat. § 45.50.562 are analogous to claims brought under § 1 of the 
11
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state and federal antitrust schemes are so similar, the plaintiffs in In re 
                                                                                                                   
 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1, and federal cases construing § 1 of the Sherman Act 
will be used as a guide); Brooks Fiber Communications v. GST Tucson Lightwave, 
992 F. Supp. 1124 (Ariz. 1997) (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1401-16 mirrors federal 
antitrust law; where summary judgment is inappropriate on federal claims under the 
Sherman Act, it is also inappropriate on state law claims under this article.); 
Oakland-Alameda County Builders’ Exch v. F.P. Lathrop Constr. Co., 4 Cal. 3d 354 
(Cal. 1971)( California’s antitrust statute the Cartwright Act is patterned after the 
federal Sherman Act, and “federal cases interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable 
in construing the Cartwright Act”); Kukui Nuts of Haw., Inc. v. R. Baird & Co., 789 
P.2d 501, (Haw. Ct. App. 1990), (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1 provides restraints on 
anticompetitive business activity, must be construed in accordance with judicial 
interpretations of similar federal antitrust statutes); Onat v. Penobscot Bay Medical 
Center, 574 A.2d 872, 876 (Me. 1990) (evidence that defendant violated Sherman 
Act would support a violation of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101, Maine’s 
antitrust provision); General Aviation, Inc. v Garrett Corp., 743 F. Supp 515 (W.D. 
Mich. 1990)(Federal precedents interpreting Sherman act are authoritative in 
considering virtually identical provisions in Michigan antitrust reform act); Metts v. 
Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 618 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)(“[Missouri’s 
Antitrust Statutes are] analogous to and derived from § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1. Section 416.141 of Missouri's Antitrust Statutes requires that §§ 416.011 
to 416.161 be construed in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of 
comparable federal antitrust statutes”); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598A.050 (1997) 
(construction of the Nevada antitrust statute “shall be construed in harmony with 
prevailing judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust statutes”); Smith Mach. Co. 
v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290,1292-93 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1073, 110 (1990) (“[New Mexico’s antitrust statute] is patterned after § 1 of the 
federal Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 et seq., and mandates a construction in 
harmony with judicial interpretations of the federal antitrust laws.”); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v Abrams, 71 NY. 2d 327, (N.Y. 1988) (“the Donnelly Act …, often 
called a ‘Little Sherman Act,’ should generally be construed in light of Federal 
precedent and given a different interpretation only where State policy, differences in 
the statutory language or the legislative history justify such a result.”); Gonzalez v. 
San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tx. App. 1994) (citing TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987) and stating that “the [Texas] state 
Antitrust Act should be construed in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of 
comparable federal antitrust statutes,”); Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia 
Properties, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 759, 767, n.10 (E.D. Va. 1982) (“The wording of the 
Virginia restraint-of-trade provision is virtually identical to that of its federal 
counterpart”). 
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Copper Antitrust Litigation73 attempted to adopt the rationale in 
Crown74 that tolling is proper where former class members assert 
claims individually that are identical to their previous class action 
claims, and argue that their federal antitrust claims should be tolled 
during the pendency of their state antitrust class action.75    
 
II. THE IN RE COPPER ANTITRUST LITIGATION DECISION:  
 
A.  Cases Leading to In re Copper Antitrust Litigation  
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision In re Copper Antitrust Litigation76 
resulted from an intriguing intersection between antitrust law and class 
action procedures.77  As mentioned supra, antitrust law is not only 
useful for providing the basis for class action claims, but also the 
interplay between state and federal class action laws provides the 
unique opportunity for plaintiffs to seek nearly identical claims in 
either state or federal court.78  As a result, a complex series of 
interrelated cases can develop, as seen in In re Copper Antitrust 
Litigation.79  Two series of cases underlying In re Copper Antitrust 
Litigation80 need to be dissected in order to understand the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision that state class action members cannot benefit from 
tolling when they file subsequent individual federal claims.  The first 
case is the underlying federal suit, where the plaintiffs in In re Copper 
                                                 
 
73In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.  
 74Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345.  
 75In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 798.   
76In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.   
77 In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 784 (Justice Wood noting that 
“[a]lthough this appeal arises out the extensive alleged conspiracy to fix price in 
various copper markets….the issues that concern us here would find a more 
comfortable home in a civil procedure class than an anti-trust class.”); Crown, Cork 
& Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983). 
78See supra notes 7, 8, and 40.    
79In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782.    
80Id. 
13
Koltse: Cross Jurisdictional Tolling of the Statute of Limitations In Ant
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
33 
Antitrust Litigation81 filed individual federal antitrust claims based on 
allegations of price fixing in copper markets.82  The statute of 
limitations for the plaintiff’s federal antitrust claims had expired, but 
the plaintiffs contended that the previous filing of a state antitrust class 
action tolled the statute of limitations for the federal suit.83  
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit also examined the plaintiff’s claims 
in the previously filed state class action to determine the availability of 
tolling in the underlying federal suit.84  
 
1. The Federal Suit:  Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. 
  
The underlying federal suit, Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 
dealt with price fixing in copper markets.85  In Loeb, Southwire 
Company, a manufacturer and distributor of electrical quality copper 
rod, wire and cable, sued three defendants (Morgan, Sumitomo and 
Global) based on alleged violations of the Sherman Act86 and the 
Clayton Act87 for conspiring to fix the price of copper.88  The district 
court determined that Southwire’s claim against the defendants 
accrued on July 23, 1996 after a press release implicated each of the 
three defendants in a price fixing scheme.89  Using this date for the 
beginning of the statute of limitations, the district court found that the 
Sherman Act and Clayton Act’s four year statute of limitations had 
expired before Southwire actually filed suit against the defendants on 
December 30, 2002, and therefore dismissed Southwire’s claims.90 
                                                 
 
81Id. 
82Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2002).  
83Id.  
84In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 787-88.   
85Loeb Indus., Inc., 306 F.3d 469.   
8615 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).  
8715 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).   
88Loeb Indus., Inc., 306 F.3d at 474-78. 
89In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 786-88. 
90Id. 
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Southwire contended that the statute of limitations under the 
Sherman Act91 and the Clayton Act92 should have been tolled because 
while the statue of limitations was running for its federal claims, it was 
involved in a state class action against both Sumitomo and Morgan for 
the very same antitrust violations it was alleging in the federal suit.93 
In order to determine whether the Southwire was entitled to the benefit 
of tolling the court examined Southwire’s antitrust claims in the 
previously filed state class action.94  
  
2. The Previous State Class Actions:  The Heliotrope Cases  
     
Southwire originally was an unnamed class member in a class 
action filed in California state court on July 8, 1996, asserting state 
law antitrust violations against Sumitomo and Global, in which 
Morgan was later added as a defendant.95  This case, Heliotrope 
General, Inc v. Sumitomo Corp.,96 (Heliotrope I) established a class of 
businesses that “purchased copper-based products and paid prices for 
such copper-based products that were inflated due to the defendants' 
manipulative and unlawful actions,” but was later abandoned by the 
plaintiffs in June of 2000.97  A second class action, Heliotrope 
General, Inc., v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd.,98 (Heliotrope II) was 
filed on June 5, 2000 and asserted the same antitrust claims under 
California law against Sumitomo, Global, and Morgan as Heliotrope 
I.99  Three months after the California Superior Court certified the 
                                                 
 
9115 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. (2006).   
9215 U.S.C. § 15, et seq. (2006).   
93In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 785-87.   
94Id. at 787 (“in order to benefit from the tolling rule for plaintiffs covered by  a 
class action announced in American Pipe, the court ruled identical legal theories 
must be involved in both cases.”) (citations omitted).  
95Heliotrope General, Inc v. Sumitomo Corp., No. 701679 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1996).  
96Id.  
97In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 787.  
98Heliotrope General, Inc., No. 749280 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000). 
99In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 787.  
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class on January 22, 2003, Southwire opted out of the class, pursuing 
its previously filed individual federal claims against the defendants.100  
 
3. The District Court’s Analysis of Southwire’s Individual 
Federal Antitrust Claims  
     
  The district court rejected Southwire’s argument that the time 
from which the second California state class action was commenced 
until Southwire exercised its right to opt out, (June 5, 2000 through 
March 22, 2003) should have tolled the statute of limitations for its 
individual federal antitrust claims asserted in Loeb.101  The district 
court completely rejected the notion of cross jurisdictional tolling, 
finding that “because the [state class action] did not involve the same 
causes of actions as those in [the federal suit] against defendants, 
plaintiffs may not claim any tolling benefit from the [state class 
action].”102  With this ruling, the district court refused to recognize the 
similarity between state and federal antitrust laws by emphasizing that 
the federal claims were different causes of action. In doing so, it 
dismissed the entire concept of cross jurisdictional tolling by requiring 
identical causes of action to facilitate tolling, a much more stringent 
standard than expressed by Justice Powell in Crown, which required 
only “the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject 
matter” to facilitate tolling.103 
 
B.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF CROSS JURISDICTIONAL 
TOLLING 
 
                                                 
 
100Id. at 787-788. (Southwire was the last plaintiff to opt-out of the class action 
on March 22, 2003). 
101Id. at 788. The district court did conclude that Southwire could benefit from 
tolling from the federal class action antitrust suit filed against Morgan, but that time 
period was not great enough to make a difference. Loeb Indus., Inc. v. J.P. Mogan & 
Co., No. 00-C-274-C (W.D. Wis. 2000).   
102In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 788.   
103 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 355 (1983). 
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Judge Cudahy issued the opinion for the court regarding the 
tolling of Southwire’s federal antitrust claims based on its previously 
filed state court class action.104  Confronting the issue of cross 
jurisdictional tolling head on, Judge Cudahy stated, “Not only is there 
no suggestion in American Pipe, or in Crown that these decisions 
construing [Rule 23] have any direct application to parallel state 
procedures, but the policies underlying American Pipe and like 
precedents simply do not apply in the cross-jurisdictional context.”105 
 
1. Does Cross Jurisdictional Tolling Promote Judicial Efficiency? 
 
  Judge Cudahy advanced two arguments to undermine the notion 
of cross jurisdictional tolling.  First, Judge Cudahy relied on the 
procedural aspects of Rule 23 to distinguish between cross and intra-
jurisdictional tolling.106  Noting that plaintiffs who seek cross 
jurisdictional tolling never face the potential to be “forced by the 
federal statute of limitation to file duplicative claims” to protect their 
interests, Judge Cudahy argued that the essential rationale behind 
American Pipe could not apply to former members of a state class 
action that later seek to sue individually in federal court.107  Through 
this argument, Judge Cudahy contends that the federal courts do not 
derive any efficiency from tolling the statute of limitations based on 
                                                 
 
104In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 793.  The majority rendered a two 
part opinion, the first dealing with question of the accrual date of Southwire’s claims 
which is beyond the scope of this article, and the second which specifically 
addressed Southwire’s tolling argument. Id. at 788-793.  
105In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,436 F.3d at 793-94 (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. 
Co., 414 U.S. 538; Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S. 345).   
106In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 794 (“The situation contemplated 
by the plaintiffs here is, however, quite different [from traditional tolling]. Here 
plaintiffs have become members of a class in a state class action but want the federal 
statute of limitations governing a factually similar federal claim to be tolled”).    
107Id. (“The essential rationale of American Pipe is that members of a class 
whose claims are embodied in a class action should not be required by the exigencies 
of the statute of limitations to clutter the courts with duplicative lawsuits as long as 
their claims are encompassed by the class action.). 
17
Koltse: Cross Jurisdictional Tolling of the Statute of Limitations In Ant
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
37 
state court actions.  This lack of efficiency became Judge Cudahy’s 
overarching concern throughout his opinion.108  Contrary to tolling 
within a jurisdiction, which is intended to prevent class members from 
presumptively filing individual actions to preserve their claims if their 
class is not certified, tolling between jurisdictions would not prevent 
presumptive filings because plaintiffs who previously filed their 
claims in state court must file a claim in federal court as a means to 
entering the federal system.109 
However, Judge Cudahy’s conclusion that tolling would not 
prevent presumptive filings is only applicable if you view the 
plaintiff’s decision to file in federal court from the perspective of the 
federal court.  Judge Cudahy’s limited perspective fails to 
acknowledge efficiency concerns of cross jurisdictional tolling beyond 
that slight chance that some state filed claims would reach federal 
court if the tolling was limited to “the same cause of action.”110  
However, there is a dual efficiency served by allowing cross 
jurisdictional tolling that Judge Cudahy’s opinion ignores.  While 
prospective state class action members have an incentive to sit on the 
sidelines and wait until a certification decision is made, or to see how 
the case is proceeding before deciding to opt out, they have no 
incentive to hold off on any federal claims they could also assert. 
Under In re Copper Antitrust Litigation,111 these state class members 
will file suit as soon as possible to meet the federal statute of 
limitations.  Judge Cudahy is correct that the timing of this individual 
federal suit does not implicate any efficiency concerns for the federal 
court once a suit is filed, but it certainly does have an effect on 
whether the state class member decides to file an individual federal 
claim in the first place.  If cross jurisdictional tolling were allowed, 
                                                 
 
108Id. at 794-795.  
109Id. at 794 (“Since filing in federal court is a prerequisite to pursuing a federal 
remedy regardless of the state class action, there will be no efficiency gain whether 
the  federal filing is made while the claimant is part of the state class action or later 
[or never]”).  
110Id. at 794-795.   
111Id.  
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state class members would not feel the pressure to concurrently file 
their individual federal antitrust claims, which would provide for an 
identical remedy as the state claim, because they could at least wait 
and see if their claims were satisfied at the state level first.  
Simply put, Judge Cudahy’s opinion assumes that prospective 
state class action members will not file suit in federal court if they are 
satisfied with the outcome in state court, without similarly assuming 
that without the benefit of tolling, state class members will 
presumptively file a federal claim as a safeguard to protect their 
identical federal interests in case the class is not certified or because 
they are not being adequately represented.  This is the reason that the 
same transaction and similar claims test is so important to the calculus 
of extending the tolling doctrine, because it forces the court to view 
the decision to file a federal suit from the plaintiff’s position.  Judge 
Cudahy is quite correct when he states that to the federal courts a 
federal antitrust claim is distinct from a state antitrust claim simply 
because of the separate jurisdictions,112 but then over extends the logic 
of his statement.  Judge Cudahy contends that whatever similarities 
exist between the state and federal antitrust laws that create an interest 
for the federal courts in the outcome of state court class actions; that 
interest is not significant enough to extend American Pipe113 to allow 
cross jurisdictional tolling.  However, when Judge Cudahy’s limits his 
view to how the federal court perceives a subsequent individual 
federal suit as only necessary to enter into the federal system, he 
overlooks the potential that state class members may never want to 
pass through the gate in the first place.  To the antitrust plaintiff the 
state and federal remedies are identical.  As a result, plaintiffs are just 
as content to resolve their claims in state court as they would be in 
federal court.  State plaintiffs have no incentive to file a federal suit 
until they determine whether or not the state suit is protecting their 
interests.  
                                                 
 
112Id. at 794.  
113Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).   
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In her dissent, Judge Wood recognizes that plaintiffs are largely 
disinterested in filing a federal suit in federal court until they realize 
their interests are not being represented or until the case is dismissed. 
Unlike Judge Cudahy, who concentrated on the difference between 
state and federal jurisdiction to conclude that cross-jurisdictional 
tolling is an over extension of the principles set forth in American 
Pipe114 and Crown, 115Judge Wood relies on the similarities between 
the state and federal jurisdictions in the antitrust class action 
context.116  Judge Wood’s dissent highlights the common ground 
between the state and federal jurisdictions through three comparisons.  
Judge Wood challenged Judge Cudahy’s contention that cross-
jurisdictional tolling would not further the efficiency of the federal 
courts.  Noting, that if tolling is limited to identical causes of actions, 
it “would encourage absent state class members to file protective 
claims to assert their new legal theories,” as opposed to waiting to see 
if their claims were resolved in the class action.117  These claims would 
not necessarily remain in state court as diversity or federal subject 
matter jurisdiction may place them in federal court.  As a result of this 
possibility, Judge Wood contended that cross jurisdictional tolling 
would allow for the efficient resolution of class actions as 
contemplated by Rule 23.118 
Clearly the federal system loses efficiency when it adopts a tolling 
rule that encourages every single state plaintiff involved in an antitrust 
class action to file a simultaneous federal suit, despite the fact they 
could obtain the exact same remedy in the state system.  The parallel 
state and federal antitrust schemes allows this case to fall into Justice 
Powell’s “same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject 
                                                 
 
114Id. 
115Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).   
116See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 803 (“Tolling here would 
recognize the near-identity of claims and transactions and at the same time further 
the goals of [Rule 23] to promote the fair and efficient adjudication of a 
controversy”).  
117Id. at 803.   
118Id.  
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matter of the original class suit”119 test indicating that in this context 
tolling is not only an appropriate extension of the tolling doctrine, but 
that cross jurisdictional tolling can promote judicial economy without 
harming defendants in the proper context. 
Judge Cudahy’s conclusion that tolling between jurisdictions 
merely lengthens the time available for plaintiffs to assert their claim 
in federal court120 highlights the paradox of cross jurisdictional tolling. 
By increasing the time in which state antitrust class members can file 
individual federal antitrust claims, the federal court can remove the 
incentive for every state class action member to presumptively filing 
federal claims, and thus promote judicial efficiency.       
 
2. Do Significant Harms Exist to Offset a Gain in Judicial Efficiency? 
 
Judge Cudahy also refused to adopt cross jurisdictional tolling on 
the basis that Rule 23 allows class action litigants to stand aside and 
let the class representative maintain their claims for them.121  In other 
words, absent class members’ claims for purposes of Rule 23 are 
functionally asserted when the class action is filed by the 
representative.  Therefore, tolling the statute of limitations until the 
class is certified, and class members are given the opportunity to opt 
out, merely recognizes that the representative tends to the class 
members’ claims.122  Judge Cudahy emphasized that this formalistic 
rationale behind tolling, which recognizes the “ordinary Rule 23 
situation”123 where the class members claims are pursued by a 
representative on their behalf is distinct from Southwire’s situation, 
                                                 
 
119Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 462 U.S at 355. 
120See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 795 (“If the requirements of the 
statute of limitations result in the federal suit’s being brought while the state class 
action is pending, there is no inefficiency or unfairness”).  
121Id. at 794 (Rule 23 is “in accordance with the theory that someone else is 
making identical claims on behalf of the silent class members”). 
122Id. (“As long as [class members] are in effect passively tendering their claim 
through inclusion in the class action, they should not be forced to proceed 
individually, whether by intervention or otherwise”).  
123Id.  
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where no one had filed a lawsuit in federal court on its behalf, and no 
one may ever file a federal suit at all.124    
Judge Cudahy also went on to challenge what he deemed Judge 
Wood’s “functional equivalence” standard,125 echoing that the 
separateness of state and federal jurisdictions overrides any benefits of 
tolling the statute of limitations simply because federal and state 
antitrust laws are similar.126  
In light of the undeniable need for a state class action litigant to 
avail themselves to federal antitrust laws by filing a suit in the federal 
courts, Judge Cudahy held that Southwire’s participation in the 
California state class action should have no effect on the tolling of the 
statute of limitations for federal antitrust claims.127 
While Judge Cudahy’s appeal to the distinct nature of the state 
and federal jurisdictions is a powerful formalistic argument, it fails to 
account for the gain in judicial efficiency associated with cross 
jurisdictional tolling in this context.  Significantly, Judge Cudahy fails 
to identify any significant harm that would result from the expansion 
of the tolling doctrine that would offset these gains in efficiency.128 
Judge Cudahy does contend that refusing to adopt cross jurisdictional 
tolling would allow defendants to be free from stale claims in due 
time,129 but this concern contradicts Judge Cudahy’s acceptance of 
Judge Wood’s conclusion that the maintenance of a state class action 
asserting a state claim that is similar to federal claims puts defendants 
                                                 
 
124Id. 
125Id. at 796.  
126Id. at 794 (“However similar or dissimilar the function of federal antitrust 
law may be with respect to state law, the federal claim is part of a distinct that must 
be pursued in a wholly different court system”).  
127Id.    
128The only harm identified by Judge Cudahy is that defendants in federal court 
should not be expected to be on notice of claims from state court proceedings “two, 
five, ten, or even more years down the road” Id. at 797. However, it is unlikely that 
if the court adopted cross jurisdictional tolling the tolling period would ever reach 
five years, let alone ten or more. The plaintiffs in In re Copper Antitrust Litig. sought 
a tolling period of two and a half years. Id. at 788.  
129Id. at 797. 
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on notice that they might be sued federally, and leads to the 
preservation of evidence and memories.130  
Judge Wood reached this conclusion by refusing to acknowledge 
any functional differences between the way California treats state class 
actions and the way Rule 23 treats federal class actions. Citing that 
California courts “recognize and preserve the rights of absentee class 
members even before the issue of certification has been 
determined,”131 Judge Wood noted that California’s class action rules 
adopt the same “representative filing” as Federal Rule 23. 132 
Extending this reasoning, Judge Wood asserted that “the fact that the 
first class action in this case happened to be in California is not 
enough [alone] to defeat [cross-jurisdictional] tolling.”133  This 
premise establishes the basis for the argument that an antitrust suit in 
state court is functionally equivalent to an antitrust claim in federal 
court.134  
Further dismantling the wall erected by Judge Cudahy between 
state and federal jurisdictions, Judge Wood examined the factual and 
legal backgrounds of the underlying state and federal suits involved in 
the litigation.135  To effectuate this examination, Judge Wood 
formulated a standard for cross jurisdictional tolling derived from 
Justice Powell’s “the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the 
subject matter” test from Crown,136 which requires that the earlier state 
court class action arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the 
subsequent federal action, and that the same claims be asserted from 
those transaction and occurrences.137  To support this formulation, 
Judge Wood maintained that the purpose of the statute of limitations is 
                                                 
 
130Id. at 796.      
131In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 801-02 (citing Shapell Indus., Inc. 
v. Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)).  
132In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 801.  
133Id.  
134Id. at 799-800. (“The claims in the [previous state class action] are 
functionally the same as those in the federal case”).  
135Id. at 800.  
136Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).  
137Id. at 355; In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 798.    
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“to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” 138  
 Accordingly, Judge Wood concentrated on whether the 
Southwire’s state court class action effectively gave the defendants in 
the federal suit notice of claims against them.139  After examining the 
claims asserted in the California state class action by Southwire, Judge 
Wood concluded that all relevant interests of the statute of limitations 
would be served by tolling because “the [previous] California suit and 
the current suit cover the same ground.”140 Therefore, the defendants 
would be aware of the claims asserted against them regardless of 
tolling.  Specifically drawing comparisons between the state and 
federal suits Judge Wood noted that “[t]he Heliotrope litigation 
involved the same facts, evidence, and witnesses as the present 
action,” and that “the two lawsuits also involve virtually identical legal 
claims, albeit with different statutory labels.”141 
Judge Wood also recognized that the similarity of the California 
antitrust laws and the federal antitrust laws could functionally preclude 
plaintiffs from alleging federal causes of action due to claim 
preclusion,142 thereby asserting that it is plaintiffs who are actually 
harmed by refusing to extend cross jurisdictional tolling, not 
defendants.  Judge Wood cites the California Supreme Court’s 
decision in Aguliar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which held that “because 
[section 1] of California’s Cartwright Act is patterned after the federal 
Sherman Act and both have their roots in common law, federal cases 
interpreting the Sherman Act are applicable in construing the 
Cartwright Act,”143 to reiterate the fact that had Southwire remained in 
                                                 
 
138In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 798 (citing Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944).  
139In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d at 799-800. 
140Id.  
141Id.  
142Id. at 801-02.     
143Id. (citing Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 
(Cal. 2001)).   
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the California State class action issues decided there would have been 
precluded in a subsequent federal antitrust suit.  While Judge Wood 
acknowledged that Southwire’s antitrust claims never faced the 
possibility of being completely barred in a federal action under 
California’s issue preclusion laws,144 Southwire would have faced the 
reality of issue-preclusion had it remained in the California class 
action.  Due to the similarities in state and federal antitrust laws,145 
Judge Wood noted that issue preclusion concerning key antitrust 
questions like relevant market would functionally bar Southwire’s 
federal claims, and thereby unnamed state class action members would 
lose the very same rights they would lose if there class action was filed 
in federal court.146   
Unlike, Judge Cudahy’s view of the relation between state and 
federal court proceedings which are necessarily separate, Judge 
Wood’s examination of issue-preclusion attempts to display the 
interrelatedness of the state and federal courts within the antitrust 
context.  Appropriately, the closer these two forums become the easier 




  It is clear that American Pipe147 simply asserts a federal interest 
in assuring the efficiency and economy of the class action 
                                                 
 
144The Supreme Court’s decision in Marrese v. American Academy of 
Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 375 (1985) dictates that state law principals of 
claim preclusion are applied in federal courts when deciding whether federal claims 
are barred by a state court’s decision.   
145Both the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 (2006), and the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006), require the plaintiff to define the relevant market 
in which an anticompetitive effect is created, and identify specific antitrust injuries 
resulting from the defendant’s actions. 
146In re Copper Antitrust Litig.,436 F.3d at 802.     
147Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).  
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procedure.148  The intricacies hidden within this broad statement reveal 
the significance of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Copper 
Antitrust Litigation.149  The dialogue between Judge Cudahy and 
Wood sets forth a paradigm for other Circuit Courts to debate the 
question of cross jurisdictional tolling.  However, the impact of 
denying the benefit of tolling to state class action plaintiffs who later 
assert federal claims creates an otherwise unnecessary incentive for 
those class members to file concurrent federal action at the 
commencement of their class action suit.  That incentive will directly 
result in a loss of judicial efficiency for the federal court system, as it 
will be required to deal with claims that otherwise never would have 
been filed.  In the end, the Seventh Circuit’s desire to maintain a rigid 
separation between the federal and state judicial system by rejecting 
cross jurisdictional tolling where state and federal claims are 
functionally identical will only intertwine the two jurisdictions further 
by instituting a policy of dual filing for antitrust claims.  
 
 
                                                 
 
148Kathleen L. Cerveny, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied:  
Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice In Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 686 
(1985).    
149In re Copper Antitrust Litig. ,436 F.3d 782.   
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